

3 **Recommended Cybersecurity**  
4 **Requirements for Consumer-**  
5 **Grade Router Products**

6 Second Preliminary Draft

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Recommended Cybersecurity  
Requirements for Consumer-  
Grade Router Products

Second Preliminary Draft

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National Institute of Standards and Technology  
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**All comments are subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).**

## **Abstract**

Ensuring the security of routers is crucial for safeguarding not only individual privacy but also the integrity of entire networks. With the increasing prevalence of smart home IoT devices and remote work setups, the significance of consumer-grade router cybersecurity has expanded, as these devices and applications often rely on routers in the home to connect to the internet. This report presents the *consumer-grade router profile*, which includes cybersecurity outcomes for consumer-grade router products and associated requirements from router standards.

## Keywords

Cybersecurity; consumer-grade routers; network security; Internet of Things

## Reports on Computer Systems Technology

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## Audience

The intended audience for this report consists of manufacturers of consumer-grade router products (especially product security officers), internet service providers, retailers, and testing and certification bodies interested in establishing minimum cybersecurity requirements for consumer-grade routers.

## Note to Reviewers

On July 18th, 2023, the White House announced the next steps for the Cybersecurity Labeling Program for Smart Devices to Protect American Consumers, referred to as the “U.S. Cyber Trust Mark.” [WHAnnouncement] In addition to announcing participation by the Federal Communications Commission and Departments of Energy and State, the White House also directed NIST to “immediately undertake an effort to define cybersecurity requirements for consumer-grade routers—a higher-risk type of product that, if compromised, can be used to eavesdrop, steal passwords, and attack other devices and high value networks.” In response, NIST worked to develop these requirements with a standards-based, transparent, community-involved process. Two discussion essays, one including a standards crosswalk [StandardsCrosswalk] were published for community feedback. This Second Preliminary Draft NISTIR is based on an initial preliminary draft that was released in advance of a December 7<sup>th</sup>, 2023, discussion forum. NIST welcome feedback on this draft and particularly seeks any recommendations of standards or guidance that can apply to consumer-grade routers and seeks reviewers’ views on the appropriate requirements for default security configurations for consumer-grade routers provided to customers (see Appendix A, Section A.2).

Comments and questions on this material should be directed to [iotsecurity@nist.gov](mailto:iotsecurity@nist.gov)

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## 1. Introduction

Router cybersecurity is of paramount importance in today's interconnected world, where digital communication plays a central role in both personal and professional spheres. Routers serve as the gatekeepers of our networks, managing the flow of data between other devices and the internet. A compromised router opens the door to a host of potential threats, ranging from unauthorized access to sensitive information to the possibility of malicious attacks on connected devices. Ensuring the security of routers is crucial for safeguarding not only individual privacy and safety but also the integrity of entire networks. With the increasing prevalence of smart home IoT devices and remote work setups, the significance of consumer-grade router cybersecurity has expanded, as these devices and applications often rely on routers in the home to connect to the internet. A secure home router (i.e., one that is consumer-grade) not only protects U.S. citizens against data theft and other cyberattacks but also contributes to the overall resilience of the global digital infrastructure. As technology advances, the need for robust router cybersecurity becomes ever more critical to maintain a safe and trustworthy digital environment.

This report presents the *consumer-grade router profile*, which recommends cybersecurity outcomes for consumer-grade router products and associated requirements from consumer-grade router standards. This profile was developed starting from the outcomes defined for consumer IoT products in *Profile of the IoT Core Baseline for Consumer IoT Products*, NISTIR 8425 [IR8425]. Though developed for consumer IoT products the NISTIR 8425 outcomes are important cybersecurity guidance for any digital product. Outcomes can be technical (i.e., implemented through hardware/software) or non-technical (i.e., implemented as procedures and processes by organizations or individuals). In this context, outcomes are broad, flexible guidelines that can apply, albeit differently, to different use cases and contexts, while requirements are targeted specifications that can define meeting an outcome for a specific use case, context, technology, etc. The guidance in this document has been developed uniquely for consumer-grade routers using cybersecurity considerations and standards specific to that product type. **NIST recommends the use of the following standards for the cybersecurity of consumer-grade router products:**

1. Broadband Forum (BBF) TR-124 Issue 8 – *Functional Requirements for Broadband Residential Gateway Devices* [BBF]
2. CableLabs (CL) *Security Gateway Device Security Best Common Practices* [CableLabs]
3. Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) TR-03148: *Secure Broadband Router - Requirements for secure Broadband Routers* [BSI]
4. Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) *Technical Specification Security Requirements for Residential Gateways* [IMDA]
5. *Platform Firmware Resiliency Guidelines*, NIST Special Publication 800-193 [SP800-193]
6. *Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations*, SP 800-161 Rev. 1 [SP800-161r1]
7. *Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1: Recommendations for Mitigating the Risk of Software Vulnerabilities*, SP 800-218 [SSDF]

8. *Information technology — Security techniques — Vulnerability disclosure processes*, ISO/IEC 29147 [ISO29147]
9. *Information technology — Security techniques — Vulnerability handling*, ISO/IEC 30111 [ISO30111]
10. *Risk management — Guidelines*, ISO 31000 [ISO31000]
11. *Systems and software engineering — Design and development of information for users*, ISO/IEC/IEEE 26514 [ISO26514]

NIST recommends use of four existing consumer-grade router standards<sup>1</sup> (i.e., items 1 through 4 in the list above). Requirements from the standards for consumer-grade routers focused primarily on the router device, discussing many cybersecurity capabilities appropriate for this equipment. Additional technical requirements for firmware are introduced by SP 800-193 (i.e., item 5). Appendix A provides a crosswalk between technical cybersecurity outcomes for consumer-grade router products and the technical requirements from these five standards.

The requirements from the four router standards address technical cybersecurity for consumer-grade router devices but not the non-technical cybersecurity outcomes nor cybersecurity for product components other than the router device (e.g., backend, mobile application) since they contain few requirements for non-technical supporting capabilities and no requirements for other product components (e.g., mobile application). Therefore, additional standards (i.e., items 6 through 11) are recommended to help fill some of those gaps in the consumer-grade router standards, particularly for non-technical outcomes. Appendix B discusses some additional considerations and guidance for non-technical outcomes.

**This list is intended as a minimum starting point** and may not address all the cybersecurity considerations for every consumer-grade router product. Full support of all outcomes in this profile by all consumer-grade router product components is expected. **To ensure cybersecurity consideration of all consumer-grade router product components, the *Product Development Cybersecurity Handbook (in development)* is recommended** in addition to the standards indicated above. If a consumer-grade router product has additional product components, such as a smart phone mobile application, additional technical product cybersecurity capability requirements would also be necessary to meet the outcomes for the complete consumer-grade router product. These considerations are discussed generally for digital products in the handbook.

The rest of this document provides additional discussion of cybersecurity context and expectations related to consumer-grade router products, structured as follows:

- Section 2 states the recommended scope of consumer-grade router products.
- Section 3 concludes the document.

## 2. Scope of Consumer-Grade Routers

This profile identifies minimum cybersecurity for consumer-grade routers. Consumer-grade routers are defined as networking devices which are primarily intended for residential use and

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
<sup>1</sup> These standards primarily focused on technical capabilities for router devices. The Broadband Forum (BBF) TR-124 Issue 8 standard includes requirements outside of the purview of cybersecurity, while the other three standards focused exclusively on cybersecurity requirements. All cybersecurity requirements were examined to create the consumer-grade router profile. Non-cybersecurity requirements from the BBF standard were not analyzed as part of the profiling process.



can be installed by the customer. Routers forward data packets, most commonly Internet Protocol (IP) packets, between networked systems. **The profile makes no distinction in its cybersecurity recommendations with regards to whether the product is owned by the customer or leased from an internet service provider.**

The cybersecurity outcomes defined in this profile are valuable to manufacturers of consumer-grade routers regardless of how their products end up in a customer's home. Routers leased from an internet service provider may be managed in part by both the customer and provider. Even in this scenario, the recommended requirements in this profile would be useful to both customers and providers in securing routers. Additional discussion related to this scope can be found in Appendix A.

Cybersecurity outcomes and requirements for products should be scoped to all product components (e.g., smartphone applications) in addition to the router device. **Fig. 1** below shows an example consumer-grade router product where the router device is supported by both a backend and smartphone application.



**Fig. 1.** An example consumer-grade router product that includes a smartphone application and backend server in addition to the router device.

Firmware is a critical foundation of many digital products, including consumer-grade routers and other consumer-grade router product components. Given the central role consumer-grade routers play in home networks, firmware vulnerabilities pose significant cybersecurity concerns. Other software that can access consumer-grade router data and manage the product (e.g., mobile applications or remote backends) also create threat vectors for home consumers if not appropriately mitigated in software and through the software development process.

### 3. Conclusion

This consumer-grade router profile can help manufacturers determine adequate cybersecurity to develop into their products. These recommendations draw from current good practices and promote adoption of accepted and vetted cybersecurity for consumer-grade routers. As with any NIST report, as the referenced standards and best practices change over time, NIST may revisit

this document and revise it. NIST welcomes on-going feedback and recommendations from the community as to standards and best practices for consumer-grade routers. That said, NIST encourages readers to identify if the standards referenced here have been updated asynchronously from this report. NIST reiterates the importance of a product-wide perspective to develop a comprehensive approach to providing cybersecurity for consumer-grade router products.

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## **Appendix A. Crosswalk between Technical Outcomes and Consumer-Grade Router Cybersecurity and Firmware Requirements**

This Appendix provides additional information about how the requirements from the four router standards relate to the consumer-grade router profile outcomes.

Sections A.1 to A.7 below show which requirements from the four consumer-grade router standards are related to the technical outcomes for consumer-grade routers. Each subsection from A.1 to A.7 states the high-level outcome along with each sub-outcome that defines the high-level outcome. The language for the consumer-grade router profile cybersecurity outcomes was developed by modifying the outcomes from NISTIR 8425. Two new sub-outcomes were also added based on review of the consumer-grade router standards, noted with a †.

For each sub-outcome, a set of related requirements from the four consumer-grade router standards is also included. The abbreviations used for the standards are:

**BBF**'s *TR-124 Issue 8* [BBF]

**CL**'s *Security Gateway Device Security Best Common Practices* [CL]

**BSI**'s *Secure Broadband Routers* [BSI]

**IMDA**'s *Security Requirements for Residential Gateways* [IMDA]

In the development of firmware for consumer-grade routers and their components, NIST recommends the use of Special Publication 800-193 [SP800-193]. Section 4 of that document details technical cybersecurity capabilities to help mitigate firmware vulnerabilities. These capabilities are supportive of the outcomes for consumer-grade router products defined in this document. Thus, in addition to the four consumer-grade router standards, requirements from Section 4 of SP 800-193 are also included in the following sub-sections when applicable.

### **A.1. Asset Identification**

The consumer-grade router product is uniquely identifiable and inventories all of the consumer-grade router product's components.

#### **A.1.1. Asset Identification 1**

The consumer-grade router product can be uniquely identified by the customer and other authorized entities via means including but not limited to: host name, service set identifier (SSID), and serial number.

*Related Standards Requirements:*

**BBF** GEN.DESIGN.12, GEN.DESIGN.13, MGMT.LOCAL.20,  
IF.LAN.WIRELESS.AP.20

**CL** OOB-011, KEY-006, OOB-007

**BSI** (3.1.2.1)

**IMDA** *None*

## **A.1.2. Asset Identification 2**

The consumer-grade router product uniquely identifies each product component (e.g., router device, mobile app) and maintains an up-to-date inventory of connected product components.

*No requirements from the consumer-grade router standards were mapped to this outcome. This outcome relates to a specifically product-wide concept (i.e., inventory of product components), and thus it is expected that standards with device-focused requirements would not address a product-focused outcome.*

## **A.2. Product Configuration**

While the configuration of the consumer-grade router product is changeable, it has default settings that “protect against the most prevalent threats and vulnerabilities without end-users having to take additional steps” [SbD, p.8]. In addition, it has the ability to restore a secure default setting, and any and all changes can only be performed by authorized individuals, services, and other consumer-grade router product components. Moving away from initial secure default settings for the router product requires actively changing the configuration.

### **A.2.3. Product Configuration 1**

Utilizing strong authentication mechanisms (e.g., multi-factor authentication), authenticated and authorized individuals (e.g., customer, ISP), services, and other consumer-grade router product components can access the consumer-grade router product’s configuration interfaces (e.g., administration page) and change the configuration settings of the consumer-grade router product via one or more consumer-grade router product components.

*Related Standards Requirements:*

**BBF** MGMT.LOCAL.2

**CL** OOB-007, DE-007, MI-002, MI-010, MI-011

**BSI** (3.1.2) (4), (4.1.1), (4.1.2), (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), (4.5), (4.8), (4.9), (4.10)

**IMDA** 4.2, 4.2.3, 4.4

### **A.2.4. Product Configuration 2**

The consumer-grade router product is provided to customers with secure default configuration settings. Authorized individuals (i.e., customer), services, and other consumer-grade router product components have the ability to restore (i.e., factory reset) the consumer-grade router product to a secure default (i.e., uninitialized) configuration. In restoring the product to a secure default, all settings and data must be deleted.

*Related Standards Requirements:*

**BBF** MGMT.LOCAL.10

**CL** OOB-009, DE-003, DE-004, DE-006

**BSI** (4.6)

434           **IMDA** 4.1.1, 4.2.1, 4.2.3  
435           **SP 800-193** 4.2.4(5), 4.4.2(5)

### 436   **A.2.5. Product Configuration 3**

437   The consumer-grade router product applies configuration settings to applicable consumer-grade  
438   router components.

439   *No requirements from the consumer-grade router standards were mapped to this outcome. This*  
440   *outcome relates to a specifically product-wide concept (i.e., application of configuration across*  
441   *all product components), and thus it is expected that standards with device-focused requirements*  
442   *would not address a product-focused outcome.*

## 443   **A.3. Data Protection**

444   The consumer-grade router product protects data stored across all consumer-grade router product  
445   components and transmitted both between consumer-grade router product components and  
446   outside the consumer-grade router product from unauthorized access, disclosure, and  
447   modification using strong encryption (e.g., FIPS 140-3 compliant modules).

### 448   **A.3.6. Data Protection 1**

449   Each consumer-grade router product component protects data it stores via secure means, such as  
450   strong encryption (e.g., FIPS 140 Rev. 3 compliant modules). All stored data, including data  
451   used for authentication (e.g., salting and hashing stored passwords or passphrases) must be  
452   protected. Critical data (including firmware images) can be securely backed up and recovered.

453   *Related Standards Requirements:*

454           **BBF** SEC.FIRMWARE.2  
455           **CL** DRP-001, KEY-001, KEY-002, KEY-003, HR-003, HR-004, SB-005, OOB-002  
456           **BSI** (4.1.1)  
457           **IMDA** 4.5  
458           **SP 800-193** 4.1.1(1-4, 7), 4.1.4(1-2), 4.2.2, 4.2.3(1-2), 4.2.4(5), 4.4.1 (1, 2a, 7, 12),  
459           4.4.2(1-2, 4, 6-8, 10)

### 460   **A.3.7. Data Protection 2**

461   The consumer-grade router product has the ability to delete or render inaccessible stored data  
462   that are either collected from or about the customer, home, family, etc.

463   *Related Standards Requirements:*

464           **BBF** None  
465           **CL** OOB-009  
466           **BSI** (4.6)

467           **IMDA 4.2.3**

468   **A.3.8. Data Protection 3**

469   When data are sent between consumer-grade router product components or outside the product,  
470   strong protections (e.g., FIPS 140-3 compliant encryption modules) are used for the data  
471   transmission. This includes using HTTP over TLS for external communications via the  
472   consumer-grade router product and for using device management interfaces or web portals for  
473   configuration management.

474   *Related Standards Requirements:*

475           **BBF** MGMT.REMOTE.WEB.6, SEC.USERINTERFACE.1, SEC.FIRMWARE.1,  
476           SEC.FIRMWARE.2

477           **CL** OOB-003, DE-002, DE-004, DE-005, MI-001, NETS-001, NETS-003, SBOM-006

478           **BSI** (3.1.2.2), (4.1.1), (4.1.2), (4.4), (4.10)

479           **IMDA** 4.2.2, 4.2.5

480   **A.4. Interface Access Control 1**

481   Each consumer-grade router product component controls access to and from all interfaces<sup>2</sup> in  
482   order to limit access to only authorized entities.

483   **A.4.9. Interface Access Control 1a**

484   Use and have access only to interfaces necessary for the consumer-grade router product's  
485   operation. All other channels and access to channels are removed or secured. For example,  
486   disable by default remote access to the router, especially via the WAN interface.

487   *Related Standards Requirements:*

488           **BBF** MGMT.LOCAL.1, MGMT.REMOTE.WEB.1, MGMT.REMOTE.WEB.5,  
489           MGMT.REMOTE.WEB.12, MGMT.REMOTE.WEB.13, SEC.GEN.5, SEC.GEN.6,  
490           SEC.GEN.10, SEC.GEN.11, SEC.USERINTERFACE.8

491           **CL** HR-001, HR-002, OOB-005, MI-003, NETS-004, NETS-005, MI-011

492           **BSI** (3), (3.1), (3.1.2), (3.2), (4.1.1)

493           **IMDA** 4.2, 4.2.1

494           **SP 800-193** 4.2.1.2

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<sup>2</sup> Interfaces are a boundary between the IoT device and entities where interactions take place. This includes digital/network interfaces, as well as local interfaces, such as graphical user interfaces.

#### **A.4.10. Interface Access Control 1b**

For all interfaces necessary for the consumer-grade router product's use, access control measures are in place.<sup>3</sup> At a minimum this includes:

1. Assigning consumer-grade router products unique initial passwords that are required to be changed to a strong password or passphrase upon installation. Support for multifactor authentication is recommended.
2. Placing a timeout limit on account sessions.
3. Protecting against authentication brute force attacks (e.g., limiting failed log-in attempts).
4. Making physical developer interface ports inaccessible from the outside of a component.
5. Ensuring closed ports are not revealed during scans.
6. Prohibiting the reply to requests over a port for an API/Protocol that doesn't use that port.

*Related Standards Requirements<sup>4</sup>:*

**BBF** GEN.DESIGN.14, GEN.OPS.21, MGMT.LOCAL.1, MGMT.LOCAL.5,  
MGMT.LOCAL.11, MGMT.REMOTE.WEB.2, MGMT.REMOTE.WEB.9,  
IF.LAN.WIRELESS.AP.20, SEC.GEN.1, SEC.GEN.8, SEC.USERINTERFACE.2,  
SEC.USERINTERFACE.3, SEC.USERINTERFACE.4, SEC.USERINTERFACE.5,  
SEC.USERINTERFACE.6, SEC.USERINTERFACE.7, SEC.USERINTERFACE.9

**CL** OOB-001, OOB-004, OOB-006, OOB-008, OOB-010, OOB-012, MI-004, MI-007,  
MI-008, MI-009, MI-010, MI-013, DIAG-002, NETS-007, NETS-008, NETA-001,  
NETA-002, NETA-003, MI-002

**BSI** (3.1), (3.1.2.1), (3.2), (4.1.1), (4.4)

**IMDA** 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.2, 4.2.1

**SP 800-193** 4.1.1(5), 4.2.4(3-4)

#### **A.4.11. Interface Access Control 1c**

For all interfaces, access and modification privileges are limited. For example, access to the administration page and changes to the configuration should be limited to authenticated users authorized to make such changes.

*Related Standards Requirements:*

**BBF** MGMT.REMOTE.WEB.3, MGMT.REMOTE.WEB.4, SEC.GEN.7

**CL** MI-006

**BSI** (3.1), (3.1.2), (3.2)

**IMDA** 4.2

<sup>3</sup> IETF RFC6092 Recommended Simple Security Capabilities in Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for Providing Residential IPv6 Internet Service [RFC6092] is a relevant source for more specific guidance related to IPv6 interface cybersecurity.

<sup>4</sup> IMDA 4.1.2 discusses password requirements, as does BSI (4.1.1)[1]. IMDA's requirement is more stringent than BSI's (i.e., minimum password character length of 10 versus 8) and is recommended by the BSI requirement.



527           **SP 800-193** 4.2.3(3), 4.2.4(1)

528   **A.5.   Interface Access Control 2**

529   Some, but not necessarily all, consumer-grade router product components have the means to  
530   protect and maintain interface access control.

531   **A.5.12.       Interface Access Control 2a**

532   Validate data received by the consumer-grade router product and validate that data shared among  
533   consumer-grade router product components match specified definitions of format and content.

534   *Related Standards Requirements:*

535           **BBF** *None*

536           **CL** MI-012, NETS-006

537           **BSI** *None*

538           **IMDA** 4.6

539           **SP 800-193** 4.1.1(6, 8), 4.2.4(2)

540   **A.5.13.       Interface Access Control 2b**

541   Prevent unauthorized transmissions or access to other product components.

542   *Related Standards Requirements:*

543           **BBF** WAN.DoS.1, WAN.DoS.2, WAN.DoS.3, WAN.DoS.4, WAN.DoS.5

544           **CL** MI-005, NETS-006

545           **BSI** (3.1.2), (4.3), (4.7), (4.9)

546           **IMDA** 4.2.1

547   **A.5.14.       Interface Access Control 2c**

548   Maintain appropriate access control during initial connection (i.e., onboarding) and when  
549   reestablishing connectivity after disconnection or outage.

550   *Related Standards Requirements:*

551           **BBF** *None*

552           **CL** *None*

553           **BSI** (3.1.2.3), (3.2)

554           **IMDA** 4.1.1, 4.2, 4.2.1

## **A.6. Software Update**

The software (including firmware) of all consumer-grade router product components can be updated by authenticated and authorized individuals, services, and other consumer-grade router product components only by using a secure and configurable mechanism, as appropriate for each consumer-grade router product component.

### **A.6.15. Software Update 1**

Each consumer-grade router product component can receive, verify, and apply verified software (including firmware) updates that are signed and encrypted.

*Related Standards Requirements:*

**BBF** GEN.OPS.22, GEN.OPS.23

**CL** KEY-004, KEY-005, SB-001, SU-001, SU-005, SBOM-009, SB-002, SU-003

**BSI** (4.2)

**IMDA** 4.3

**SP 800-193** 4.1.1(4), 4.1.2(1-4), 4.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2(1), 4.2.4(3, 5), 4.3.1(2), 4.4.1(2-6)

### **A.6.16. Software Update 2**

The consumer-grade router product implements measures to keep software (including firmware) on consumer-grade router product components up to date (i.e., automatic application of updates or consistent customer notification of available updates via consumer-grade router components), including provisions to prevent firmware rollback attacks.

*Related Standards Requirements:*

**BBF** GEN.OPS.19, GEN.OPS.20, MGMT.LOCAL.15, MGMT.LOCAL.21, MGMT.LOCAL.22

**CL** SB-003, SU-002, SU-006, SBOM-003, SBOM-007, SBOM-008, SBOM-010

**BSI** (4.1.2), (4.2)

**IMDA** 4.3

**SP 800-193** 4.1.2(5), 4.2.1.3, 4.4.1(1, 10, 11, 13)

### **A.6.17. Software Update 3<sup>†</sup>**

Integrity of data, including configuration, is preserved when an update is applied. In the case of a failed update, the product should revert to a usable state.

*Related Standards Requirements:*

**BBF** GEN.OPS.15, GEN.OPS.24

**CL** SU-004

**BSI** None

588 **IMDA** *None*

589 **SP 800-193** 4.3.1(3)

## 590 **A.7. Cybersecurity State Awareness**

591 The consumer-grade router product supports detection of cybersecurity incidents affecting or  
592 affected by consumer-grade router product components and the data they store and transmit.

### 593 **A.7.18. Cybersecurity State Awareness 1**

594 The consumer-grade router product securely captures and records information about the state of  
595 consumer-grade router components that can be used to detect cybersecurity incidents affecting or  
596 affected by consumer-grade router product components and the data they store and transmit.  
597 Information that the consumer-grade router product shall provide includes login attempts,  
598 administrative events, system status, firewall status, status of all consumer-grade router product  
599 components, other connected products, and timing synchronization.

600 *Related Standards Requirements:*

601 **BBF** GEN.OPS.18, LAN.FW.2, LAN.FW.3, LAN.FW.4, MGMT.LOCAL.18,  
602 MGMT.LOCAL.20

603 **CL** SB-004, LOG-001, LOG-002, LOG-003, LOG-004, LOG-005, SB-002, TS-001

604 **BSI** (4.1.2), (4.8)

605 **IMDA** *None*

606 **SP 800-193** 4.1.1(4), 4.1.3, 4.3.1(1, 5), 4.3.2(1-2, 4), 4.4.1(8), 4.4.2(3)

### 607 **A.7.19. Cybersecurity State Awareness 2<sup>†</sup>**

608 Where and when applicable, the consumer-grade router product may inform authorized entities  
609 about or respond directly to changes in cybersecurity information.

610 *Related Standards Requirements:*

611 **BBF** GEN.OPS.6

612 **CL** AR-002

613 **BSI** *None*

614 **IMDA** *None*

615 **SP 800-193** 4.1.3(3), 4.3.1(2-4, 6), 4.3.2(3, 5-6), 4.4.1(9, 11), 4.4.2(9)

## 616 **Appendix B. Non-Technical Outcome Considerations**

617 **Table 1** below states the non-technical cybersecurity outcomes NIST has defined for the  
618 consumer-grade router profile with the requirements from the four consumer-grade router  
619 standards that related to these outcomes.

**Table 1.** Non-technical cybersecurity outcomes and requirements from consumer-grade router standards

Consumer-Grade Router Profile Non-Technical Outcome	Related Requirements
<b>Documentation</b> <i>The consumer-grade router product developer creates, gathers, and stores information relevant to cybersecurity of the consumer-grade router product and its product components prior to customer purchase, and throughout the development of a product and its subsequent lifecycle.</i>	CL HR-005, MI-014, DIAG-001, SBOM-004, SBOM-005
<b>Information and Query Reception</b> <i>The consumer-grade router product developer has the ability to receive information relevant to cybersecurity and respond to queries from the customer and others about information relevant to cybersecurity.</i>	-
<b>Information Dissemination</b> <i>The consumer-grade router product developer broadcasts (e.g., to the public) and distributes (e.g., to the customer or others in the consumer-grade router product ecosystem) information relevant to cybersecurity.</i>	CL AR-001, SBOM-011 BSI (4.2) IMDA 4.3e
<b>Education and Awareness</b> <i>The consumer-grade router product developer creates awareness of and educates customers and others in the consumer-grade router product ecosystem about cybersecurity-related information (e.g., considerations, features) related to the consumer-grade router product and its product components.</i>	-

The standards do not thoroughly address the non-technical outcomes, but NIST reiterates that consumer-grade router products should be supported by all the non-technical outcomes included in this profile. Implementation of non-technical outcomes may not have to be tailored for a product type (i.e., consumer-grade routers) and may be deployed similarly for different digital products. For example, a vulnerability management program is not likely to vary significantly in implementation for consumer-grade routers, smart thermostats, personal computers, etc. Thus, product-agnostic approaches to the non-technical outcomes as discussed in the *Product Development Cybersecurity Handbook (in development)* are recommended in addition to the non-technical requirements included in the four consumer-grade router standards. The handbook guides a developer through important cybersecurity considerations when developing digital products. Though the handbook is generally contextualized around IoT products, the concepts discussed can apply to any digital product with a physical component in the customer's environment (e.g., consumer-grade router device). There are many non-technical cybersecurity considerations discussed in the handbook, but the following are key considerations for consumer-grade router products given the role these devices play in home networks:

**Risk management** in both planning and execution of consumer-grade router products will help identify and mitigate cybersecurity risks throughout the product lifecycle. Risks faced by consumer-grade router products can be significant. Consumer-grade router devices have a unique vantage and access to home networks. They also have robust networking capabilities, giving them utility for a wide range of attacks. Other consumer-grade router product components present their own risks. Backends may aggregate data from one or more customers, making them attractive targets for attackers. Mobile applications may be installed in relatively hostile environments due to malware and other vectors of attack. ISO 31000 [ISO31000] is a foundational resource that developers should use for risk management. NIST's *Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations: A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy*, SP 800-37 Rev. 2 [SP800-37r2] may also be useful guidance for risk management.

**Secure development processes** for both hardware and software are also critical for the cybersecurity of consumer-grade router products. *Hardware-Enabled Security: Enabling a Layered Approach to Platform Security for Cloud and Edge Computing Use Cases*, NISTIR 8320 [IR8320] may be a helpful resource for consumer-grade router product developers as they consider hardware in relation the cybersecurity of their products. A recommended resource available to all software developers is NIST's Secure Software Development Framework [SSDF], which includes fundamental, sound, and secure software development practices. The SSDF can help a software developer align and prioritize its secure software development activities with its business/mission requirements, risk tolerances, and resources. Like NISTIR 8425, the SSDF's practices are outcome-based. The SSDF's practices, tasks, and implementation examples represent a starting point to consider. In the context of consumer-grade router products, all SSDF practices are recommended to be implemented as part of the software development lifecycle of a consumer-grade router products' firmware and other software. Some SSDF practices may be more applicable to certain types of software. Appendix B presents a detailed crosswalk listing all SSDF tasks and their applicability to three kinds of firmware or software commonly part of consumer-grade router products: router firmware, mobile applications, remote backend/web applications.

**Vulnerability management** is critical for consumer-grade router products and is addressed by portions of all four non-technical cybersecurity outcomes. Consumer grade router products should be developed to minimize known and foreseeable vulnerabilities. In addition, manufacturers should develop a robust vulnerability management plan for their products that will identify vulnerabilities to quickly and effectively mitigate them in their products. For this, they should use ISO/IEC 29147 [ISO29147] and ISO/IEC 30111 [ISO30111], which are important resources for vulnerability disclosure and handling, respectively. From NIST, *Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning: Preventive Maintenance for Technology*, SP 800-40 Rev. 4 [SP800-40r4] can also be a helpful resource for consumer-grade router product developers as they plan for, discover, prioritize, and respond to vulnerabilities in their products.

**Customer engagement on cybersecurity**, which is called Education and Awareness in the non-technical outcomes, facilitates use of technical cybersecurity features and adoption of good cybersecurity by customers. ISO/IEC/IEEE 26514 [ISO26514] provides guidance on the design and development of information for users, which may be helpful to and is recommended for consumer-grade router product developers as they create the manual and other materials for the device that a customer may seek out for cybersecurity instructions related to the product.

These are highlighted considerations. Manufacturers should implement robust non-technical cybersecurity support that includes all aspects of documenting cybersecurity pertinent information, establishing means to receive and disseminate cybersecurity pertinent information related to the product, and fostering cybersecurity education and awareness among customers related to the product.

## Appendix C. Consumer-Grade Router Acquisition Scenarios Discussion

Routers are network devices that forward data packets, most commonly Internet Protocol (IP) packets, between networked systems. They may be wired (e.g., Ethernet), wireless (e.g., Wi-Fi), or both. *Consumer-grade* identifies those routers that may appear in an individual’s residence such that their primary use case is residential rather than enterprise, industrial, etc. However, some small businesses may choose to use consumer grade equipment given the limited performance needs of those businesses. The presumption for consumer equipment, or small businesses that use consumer grade equipment, is that the manufacturer cannot assume the user has cybersecurity expertise or an ability to take significant action to secure the product.

Consumer-grade routers may be acquired by households in at least two ways<sup>5</sup>:

1. Purchase of the equipment directly from a retailer.
2. Bundling and/or renting of the equipment from a service provider.

Each of these scenarios may have implications for how cybersecurity outcomes could be met by the consumer-grade router product. Consumer-owned equipment may be fully managed by the household or may have some security services provided externally. Alternatively, bundled/rental equipment will likely be managed in part by the service provider.

**Table 2.** Scope Coverage of the Consumer-Grade Router Standards Analyzed

Consumer-Grade Router Standard	Applicable to...	
	Consumer-Owned Routers?	ISP-Owned, Customer-Leased Routers?
TR-124 Issue 8 [BBF]	Yes	Yes
Security Gateway Device Security Best Common Practices [CL]	Yes	Yes
Secure Broadband Routers [BSI]	Yes	Yes
Security Requirements for Residential Gateways [IMDA]	Yes	No

As summarized in **Table 2**, the scope statements of three of the four standards examined either make no distinction about how the router is acquired by customers or state that the guidance applies to both scenarios.

BBF does not distinguish between the two methods of acquisition, stating “a Residential Gateway implementing the general requirements of TR-124 will incorporate at least one embedded WAN interface, routing, bridging, a basic or enhanced firewall, one or multiple LAN interfaces and home networking functionality that can be deployed as a consumer self-installable device.” It notably highlights that included are products that can be deployed as “consumer self-installable,” which includes the customer purchased scenario, as well as most instances of service provider supplied routers.

CableLabs directly acknowledges both scenarios: “This Gateway Device Security document specifies best common practices to serve as an industry metric for retail and leased devices (both gateways and cable modems) for security—this includes manufacturing process, supply chain, hardware and firmware configuration procedures, software, and management protocols.”

<sup>5</sup> As of 2022, about half of consumer-grade routers are received from ISPs rather than acquired by customers directly. [ParksRouterResearch]

The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) focuses its requirements on how the product is used rather than acquired, stating “In scope of this Technical Guideline are requirements on a router as a hardware component with an installed operating system and services provided to an end-user. The router serves the purpose of establishing a connection to the infrastructure of an Internet Access Provider (IAP) to gain internet access. From the end-user’s perspective the router offers a gateway to the internet as well as management functionalities for the end-user’s private network. The Technical Guideline describes requirements on the router that should be implemented to offer a secure operation of the router for the end-user.” Thus, the requirements can be applied to the scenario of when customers purchase a router and when a router is provided by or rented from a service provider.

Unlike the others, the IMDA alludes to a focus on only routers purchased by customers, stating that the goal is “ensuring that these devices are better protected when purchased and deployed by consumers.”

## Appendix D. Crosswalk Between Secure Software Development Tasks and Consumer-Grade Router Product Software Type

This appendix presents a detailed crosswalk listing all SSDF tasks and their applicability to three kinds of firmware or software commonly part of consumer-grade router products: router firmware, mobile applications, remote backend/web applications.

- *Router firmware* is a form of device firmware specific to consumer-grade router devices. *Device firmware* generally is “the collection of non-host processor firmware and Expansion ROM firmware that is only used by a specific device. This firmware is typically provided by the device manufacturer” [SP800-193].
- *Mobile applications* are software intended to be installed and/or executed on small profile platforms that can connect to cellular data networks. For example, applications made to run on Apple’s iOS or Alphabet’s Android operating systems.
- *Remote backend/web applications* are software intended to be hosted and executed on dedicated or shared servers that may provide services to many products at once. For example, code supporting consumer-grade routers that is hosted in a cloud environment.

**Table 3** below indicates which SSDF tasks may be most appropriate for each kind of firmware or software. SSDF tasks that may be appropriate to a software type, but utilization of the task may be contextual to the development process or environment are noted with (parentheses).

**Table 3.** Crosswalk between consumer-grade router product software types and SSDF tasks.

SSDF Task	Recommended for Router...
PO.1.1: Identify and document all security requirements for the organization’s software development infrastructures and processes, and maintain the requirements over time.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
PO.1.2: Identify and document all security requirements for organization-developed software to meet, and maintain the requirements over time.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.

SSDF Task	Recommended for Router...
PO.1.3: Communicate requirements to all third parties who will provide commercial software components to the organization for reuse by the organization's own software. [Formerly PW.3.1]	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
PO.2.1: Create new roles and alter responsibilities for existing roles as needed to encompass all parts of the SDLC. Periodically review and maintain the defined roles and responsibilities, updating them as needed.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
PO.2.2: Provide role-based training for all personnel with responsibilities that contribute to secure development. Periodically review personnel proficiency and role-based training, and update the training as needed.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
PO.2.3: Obtain upper management or authorizing official commitment to secure development, and convey that commitment to all with development-related roles and responsibilities.	(Firmware), (Mobile App.), (Web App.)
PO.3.1: Specify which tools or tool types must or should be included in each toolchain to mitigate identified risks, as well as how the toolchain components are to be integrated with each other.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
PO.3.2: Follow recommended security practices to deploy, operate, and maintain tools and toolchains.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
PO.3.3: Configure tools to generate artifacts of their support of secure software development practices as defined by the organization.	(Firmware), (Mobile App.), (Web App.)
PO.4.1: Define criteria for software security checks and track throughout the SDLC.	(Firmware), (Mobile App.), (Web App.)
PO.4.2: Implement processes, mechanisms, etc. to gather and safeguard the necessary information in support of the criteria.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
PO.5.1: Separate and protect each environment involved in software development.	Firmware
PO.5.2: Secure and harden development endpoints (i.e., endpoints for software designers, developers, testers, builders, etc.) to perform development-related tasks using a risk-based approach.	Firmware
PS.1.1: Store all forms of code – including source code, executable code, and configuration-as-code – based on the principle of least privilege so that only authorized personnel, tools, services, etc. have access.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
PS.2.1: Make software integrity verification information available to software acquirers.	(Web App.)
PS.3.1: Securely archive the necessary files and supporting data (e.g., integrity verification information, provenance data) to be retained for each software release.	Firmware, Mobile App.
PS.3.2: Collect, safeguard, maintain, and share provenance data for all components of each software release (e.g., in a software bill of materials [SBOM]).	Firmware, Mobile App.
PW.1.1: Use forms of risk modeling – such as threat modeling, attack modeling, or attack surface mapping – to help assess the security risk for the software.	Firmware, (Mobile App.), (Web App.)
PW.1.2: Track and maintain the software's security requirements, risks, and design decisions.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.



<b>SSDF Task</b>	<b>Recommended for Router...</b>
PW.1.3: Where appropriate, build in support for using standardized security features and services (e.g., enabling software to integrate with existing log management, identity management, access control, and vulnerability management systems) instead of creating proprietary implementations of security features and services. [Formerly PW.4.3]	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
PW.2.1: Have 1) a qualified person (or people) who were not involved with the design and/or 2) automated processes instantiated in the toolchain review the software design to confirm and enforce that it meets all of the security requirements and satisfactorily addresses the identified risk information.	Firmware
PW.4.1: Acquire and maintain well-secured software components (e.g., software libraries, modules, middleware, frameworks) from commercial, open-source, and other third-party developers for use by the organization's software.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
PW.4.2: Create and maintain well-secured software components in-house following SDLC processes to meet common internal software development needs that cannot be better met by third-party software components.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
PW.4.4: Verify that acquired commercial, open-source, and all other third-party software components comply with the requirements, as defined by the organization, throughout their life cycles.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
PW.5.1: Follow all secure coding practices that are appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization's requirements.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
PW.6.1: Use compiler, interpreter, and build tools that offer features to improve executable security.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
PW.6.2: Determine which compiler, interpreter, and build tool features should be used and how each should be configured, then implement and use the approved configurations.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
PW.7.1: Determine whether code review (a person looks directly at the code to find issues) and/or code analysis (tools are used to find issues in code, either in a fully automated way or in conjunction with a person) should be used, as defined by the organization.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
PW.7.2: Perform the code review and/or code analysis based on the organization's secure coding standards, and record and triage all discovered issues and recommended remediations in the development team's workflow or issue tracking system.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
PW.8.1: Determine whether executable code testing should be performed to find vulnerabilities not identified by previous reviews, analysis, or testing and, if so, which types of testing should be used.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
PW.8.2: Scope the testing, design the tests, perform the testing, and document the results, including recording and triaging all discovered issues and recommended remediations in the development team's workflow or issue tracking system.	Firmware, (Mobile App.), (Web App.)
PW.9.1: Define a secure baseline by determining how to configure each setting that has an effect on security or a security-related setting so that the default settings are secure and do not weaken the security functions provided by the platform, network infrastructure, or services.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.

SSDF Task	Recommended for Router...
PW.9.2: Implement the default settings (or groups of default settings, if applicable), and document each setting for software administrators.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
RV.1.1: Gather information from software acquirers, users, and public sources on potential vulnerabilities in the software and third-party components that the software uses, and investigate all credible reports.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
RV.1.2: Review, analyze, and/or test the software's code to identify or confirm the presence of previously undetected vulnerabilities.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
RV.1.3: Have a policy that addresses vulnerability disclosure and remediation, and implement the roles, responsibilities, and processes needed to support that policy.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
RV.2.1: Analyze each vulnerability to gather sufficient information about risk to plan its remediation or other risk response.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
RV.2.2: Plan and implement risk responses for vulnerabilities.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
RV.3.1: Analyze identified vulnerabilities to determine their root causes.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
RV.3.2: Analyze the root causes over time to identify patterns, such as a particular secure coding practice not being followed consistently.	Firmware, Mobile App., Web App.
RV.3.3: Review the software for similar vulnerabilities to eradicate a class of vulnerabilities, and proactively fix them rather than waiting for external reports.	(Firmware), (Mobile App.), (Web App.)
RV.3.4: Review the SDLC process, and update it if appropriate to prevent (or reduce the likelihood of) the root cause recurring in updates to the software or in new software that is created.	(Firmware), (Mobile App.), (Web App.)

## 753 Appendix E. List of Symbols, Abbreviations, and Acronyms

### 754 BBF

755 Broadband Forum

### 756 BSI

757 Federal Office for Information Security

### 758 CL

759 CableLabs

### 760 IMDA

761 Infocomm Media Development Authority

### 762 IoT

763 Internet of Things

## 764 Appendix F. Glossary

### 765 Consumer-Grade Router Device

766 Networking devices which are primarily intended for residential use and can be installed by the customer. Routers  
767 forward data packets, most commonly Internet Protocol (IP) packets, between networked systems.

### 768 Consumer-Grade Router Product

769 Consumer-grade router device and any additional product components (e.g., backend, smartphone application) that  
770 are necessary to use the consumer-grade router device beyond basic operational features. [IR8425, adapted]

771 **Cybersecurity Outcome**

772 Statement of what is expected either from a product or from an organization in support of a product related to the  
773 cybersecurity of that product. Can be technical, in the form of product cybersecurity capabilities or non-technical, in  
774 the form of non-technical supporting capabilities.

775 **Non-technical Supporting Capability**

776 Non-technical supporting capabilities are actions an organization performs in support of the cybersecurity of a  
777 product. [IR8425, adapted]

778 **Product Cybersecurity Capability**

779 Cybersecurity features or functions that computing devices provide through their own technical means (i.e., device  
780 hardware and software). [IR8425]